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‘It’s All About Oil’
The Conventional Wisdom
If there is any agreement among the
pundits, this surely must be it: the
coming war on Iraq will be fought
largely over oil. The gist of the
argument is simple enough, and can be
summarized as follows:
·
In order to continue growing, the
world economy needs plenty of
cheap oil;
·
The OPEC cartel stands in the way
of that goal. For years, its members
have manipulated output to keep
prices high;
·
Now, there is finally an opportunity
to change the rules of the game,
perhaps even to make the oil cartel
irrelevant;
·
The entry point is Iraq. The country,
says George Bush Jr., has become a
‘global threat.’ It supports terrorism,
it has weapons of mass destruction,
and it has a ruler unscrupulous
enough to use them. In the age of
‘preventive strikes,’ these are
sufficient reasons to invade thy
neighbour;
·
Once victorious, the invading
armies will install a new, more
friendly leader. This ruler will adopt
a new energy policy, hostile to
OPEC and friendly to the United
States and the West. And since Iraq
has 11 per cent of the world’s crude
oil reserves and the ability to pump
out plenty of it, the days of high oil
prices will soon be over.
The Economist of London expresses
this logic as follows: ‘America’s chief
interest in going after Iraq’s president,
Saddam Hussein, is doubtless to save
the world from his actual or potential
weapons of mass destruction. Another
large consideration, secondary as it
may be, has attracted less attention
than it should have: the effects that
would follow from the opening up of
the country’s enormous reserves of
oil.... It might seem, then, that
knocking out Mr Hussein would kill
two birds with one stone: a dangerous
dictator would be gone, and with him
would go the cartel that for years has
manipulated prices, engineered
embargoes and otherwise harmed
consumers.’
The Middle East presently accounts for
65 per cent of the world’s proven oil
reserves and 30 per cent of its day to
day production –
and the figures are
only expected to
grow in the coming
decades. According
to Professor
Anthony Cordesman
of the Washington
Center for Strategic
and International
Studies, these facts
lead to a simple conclusion. Given that
US prosperity depends on global
prosperity, he says, and since global
prosperity depends on free access to
Middle East oil reserves, it follows that
the Gulf region, where most of this oil
comes from, must be treated as ‘a truly
vital American strategic interest.’ The
United States, he continues, is the only
country with the political, economic
and military power to secure this
global (read national) interest, and it
should therefore take direct
responsibility through direct
involvement in the region.
Radical writers generally agree that the
United States is after oil, although
many of them add that the pursuit of
energy is part of a larger game-plan
whose aim is not economic prosperity
per se, but power. ‘What the world is
now facing,’ write the editors of
Monthly Review, ‘is the prospect of a
major new development in the history
of imperialism.’ ‘Direct US access to
oil and the profits of US oil
corporations,’ they maintain, ‘are not
enough by themselves to explain
overriding US interests in the
Middle East. Rather the United
States sees the whole region as a
crucial part of its strategy of
global power.’
The Catch
These views all ring true.
Without oil, the world economy
will certainly come to a halt;
capitalism will fall into a serious crisis;
and US hegemony would be dealt a
serious, perhaps mortal blow. That
much is obvious.
But then these same arguments could
have been made – and were made – in
the 1960s, in the 1970s and in the
1980s. So why the sudden return to
old-style ‘imperialism’?
Indeed, the whole situation seems
paradoxical. During the 1970s, when
the Middle East accounted for nearly
40 per cent of global output (compared
with only 30 per cent today), the
United States and Europe actually
moved in the opposite direction,
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allowing local rulers to nationalise
their oil resources and to kick out
Western oil companies. In other words,
these governments tolerated a blatant
attack on ‘private property’ – and
tolerate it they did despite the fact that
the property in question belonged to
the world’s most powerful firms, and
that OPEC’s obvious intention was to
raise the price of oil.
By comparison, the current
situation seems far less
menacing. Judging by the
real price of oil, which kept
falling for the past twenty
years, OPEC has been rather
ineffective. In 1999, when
the price of oil plunged to
$10 a barrel, The Economist
confidently stated that ‘the
world is awash with oil, and
it is likely to remain so.’
Under these circumstances,
and assuming it is indeed
‘all about oil,’ shouldn’t the
cartel be left alone to pursue
its futile manoeuvres? Or
perhaps OPEC’s
ineffectiveness is precisely
the problem?
Much of the confusion stems
from two mistaken
assumptions: first, that OPEC had
‘expropriated’ the oil companies and
that these companies now want to
‘reclaim’ their lost concessions, and
second, that Western governments
want nothing more than low oil prices.
As it turns out, the situation is a bit
more complicated.
The Global Politics of Oil
Start with OPEC and the companies.
In the 1970s, the latter indeed lost
their drilling concessions to the former.
But oil companies aren’t interested in
drilling concessions, they are
interested in profit. And here
OPEC gave them something
really precious: a 10-fold
increase in the real price of oil
between 1970 and 1980. The oil
companies could never have
achieved this pricing feat on
their own. And what a feat it
was: it made their profits rise 5-fold in
just ten years!
The converging interests of OPEC and
the oil companies are illustrated in
Figure 1. The chart shows the profits
of the world’s ‘Petro Core’ consisting
of the six largest private oil companies:
British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon,
Mobil, Royal/Dutch Shell and Texaco.
It also shows the oil revenues earned
by OPEC governments. The positive
correlation is obvious and needs no
further elaboration. What was good for
OPEC was also good for the oil
companies, and vice versa.
And indeed, the oil companies quickly
realized they had no reason to fuss over
oil fields and drilling rights. On the
contrary, it was much better to have the
cartel manage output and take on the
criticism for the ‘energy crisis.’
Naturally, the oil companies insisted
they had nothing to do with the ploy.
They were merely ‘interested
bystanders,’ as one famous analyst put
it. They simply happened to be in the
right place at the right time. Their
profits were huge, sure, but they were
‘windfall profits,’ the result of an
accidental bliss.
As experts would later show, this
picture was a bit distorted, to put it
mildly. There was in fact vast
technical, business and political
cooperation between OPEC and the
companies. But then, since this type of
research rarely made it to the popular
media, most people, although often
suspecting the oil companies, never
really knew why.
Of course, whether or not they knew
about it, ordinary people suffered
greatly from this mischievous
arrangement. During the 1970s and
early 1980s, higher oil prices
have thrown the world into a
stagflationary spiral of rising
prices together with
contracting output and soaring
unemployment. But then,
suffering doesn’t give you a
say in the global political
economy of oil. Power does.
From Crisis to Prices
As noted earlier, there is a
popular belief that Western
governments, representing the
‘national interest,’ are keen on
having low oil prices. The
problem with this view is that
those who articulate the
‘national interest’ often tailor
it to their own ends. Or better
still, they articulate it in
words, but ignore it in deeds.
During the 1970s and 1980s,
the ‘national interest’ of the United
States was dominated by a
‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’
made of large armament, oil and
financial companies. The long
tentacles of this coalition have become
difficult to disentangle from the
various apparatuses of the state. Their
representatives sat in White House;
they had their envoys in various
branches of the government and the
army to whom they supplied weapons;
they paid taxes and received subsidies
(with the latter often exceeding the
former); they financed political
campaigns; they influenced and often
determined policy; they owned
various media outlets. The list
goes on.
This coalition had an interest in
high oil prices. It couldn’t admit
it openly, of course, and the US
government never tired of
reiterating its ‘commitment’ to cheap
energy. But when it came to the United
States’ actual foreign policies,
particularly in the Middle East, the
effect was generally to raise prices, not
lower them.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the
‘national interest’ of the United States
was dominated by a ‘Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition’
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After the end of the Vietnam Conflict, the
main ‘hot spot’ of the Cold War shifted to
the Middle East. The United States and
the Soviet Union, aided by numerous
other countries, supplied massive
amounts of weapons to the region
(invariably in the interest of
‘stabilization’). The regional arms race
made the US military contractors rich,
and with a succession of hawkish
presidents in office – from Richard
Nixon, to Gerald Ford, to Ronald Reagan
– the contractors found it easy to keep
that race going. Even the conciliatory
Jimmy Carter, whose 1976-80 term in
office briefly broke the bellicosity chain,
couldn’t buck the trend.
Conflict and war in the region had a
profound impact on oil. It is important to
note that during the 1970s and 1980s,
there was never any real ‘shortage’ of oil
in the world. Indeed, from a purely
‘economic’ perspective, the price of oil
should have tumbled. But the region was
‘in flames,’ with cyclical hostilities
nourished by Western and Eastern
weapons and hyped up relentlessly by the
media. Oil, although plentiful throughout
the period, was made to look ‘scarce’ and
‘vulnerable.’ The price of oil was raised
and kept high, OPECs oil revenues
soared and the oil companies grew
fabulously rich.
Reversal of Fortune
By the mid 1980s, the tide finally began
to turn. Communism was on its last leg;
developing countries had become
‘emerging markets’ open to
western investment; the
high-tech mania started to
gather momentum; and the
winds of neoliberalism began
blowing stronger and
stronger.
The Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition was
increasingly challenged by a
new ‘Technodollar-
Mergerdollar Coalition’
geared toward high-tech,
global expansion and
corporate mergers. For this
new coalition, high energy
prices were a threat. They
spoiled business confidence
and growth in ‘emerging
markets,’ they upset capital
mobility, and they interfered
with the hyping up of the
stock market.
But from then on, it was all downhill.
The lingering Iraq-Iran War of 1980-88,
the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the
1986 bombing of Libya, the
mid 1980s ‘tanker war’ in the
Persian Gulf and the 1990/91
Gulf War, all helped to slow
down the slide, but they didn’t
stop it. And as prices fell so
did profits. The abyss was
reached at the end of Clinton’s
presidency. In 2000, oil prices
tumbled to $14 a barrel in
today’s dollars, and the share
of oil companies in global
profit fell to less than 3 per cent – their
lowest ever.
Toward a New War
Something had to be done, and quickly.
The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition
assailed the White House with all its guns
blazing. They spared no effort. Massive
financial support, legal pressures,
electoral manoeuvres, deceit and outright
forgery were all brought to bear. In the
end the coalition managed to have
George Bush Jr. put in office.
The Bush family ties to the US business
elite, including the Harrimans, Morgans
and Rockefellers among others, go back
to Bert Walker, George Bush Jr.’s great-
grandfather. Over the years, the family
has come to occupy, through ownership
and managerial posts, various strategic
positions in railroads, finance, oil and
armament. It also placed itself well in the
seats of government, state security and
military procurement. In addition
to God and the mighty dollar, the
family has retained a strong belief
in white supremacy, especially the
supremacy of the Eastern seaboard
elites. It has also entertained close
links to far-right and neo-Nazi
groups within the Republican
party. With this background,
George Bush Jr., although not the
brightest of the lot, was certainly
fit for the task of reinstating the
Weapondollar-Petrodollar
Coalition.
The main excuse was September
11. The US immediately started
beating the war drums, and within
a month invaded Afghanistan in
search for the ghostly Bin Laden. It
didn’t find him there, but the price
of oil kept rising. In parallel, and
in sharp contrast to his White
House predecessor, Bush Jr. gave
The growing strength of the new
coalition became evident as early as
1991. George Bush Sr., a Weapondollar-
Petrodollar loyalist
who had just
orchestrated a major
international war,
was more or less
forced to announce
the dawn of a ‘new
world order’ of
peace. His successor,
Bill Clinton, was
already a declared
‘peacenick’ who
moved swiftly toward resolving the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The shift from war profits
to peace dividends was now in full swing.
The effect of this shift on the armament
and oil interests was devastating. During
the 1990s, world military budgets fell by
over 1/3rd in real terms, arms exports
went into a tail spin, and the large
armament contractors were reduced to a
mere shadow of their past glory.
The oil companies suffered a similar fate.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between
their net profit and the price of oil.
During the early 1980s, crude prices
expressed in today’s dollars exceeded $80
a barrel. For the world, this was the
height of the ‘energy crisis.’ For the oil
companies, it was the peak of the ‘energy
boom’: their earnings reached nearly 20
per cent of all global corporate profit.
They need higher
oil prices, and the
most effective way
of raising these
prices is to have
another Middle
East conflict
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The global debt burden is the highest
ever in history – roughly twice what it
was on the eve of the Great Depression.
Corporate pricing power, on the other
hand, is perhaps the weakest since the
Depression. Under these circumstances, if
disinflation were to give way to falling
prices, the specter of chain bankruptcies
and debt deflation could make the Great
Depression look like child’s
play. Given this risk, any
move toward higher
inflation – even if
accompanied by stagnation
– is to be warmly
welcomed.
Now, since the late 1960s,
higher oil prices have
always triggered higher
inflation. And the ‘mechanism’ continues
to operate like clockwork: since 1999,
world inflation trailed the gyrations of oil
prices with almost religious devotion.
Thus, if oil prices continue to rise,
inflation will most likely follow; this
would in turn remove the specter of
deflation, and the large companies could
sound a big sigh of relief. For these
companies there would also be an icing
on the cake. Inflation usually works to
redistribute income from labour to capital
and from small firms to larger ones. It
will therefore make the leading
companies better off relatively, if not
absolutely.
For the world, this
was the height of
the ‘energy crisis’.
For the oil
companies, it was
the peak of the
‘energy boom’
Ariel Sharon a carte blanche to deal with
the Palestinians as he saw fit. The
resulting escalation contributed further to
the feeling that the region was again in
flames, and that oil was once more likely
to become ‘scarce.’ These developments,
together with a timely oil strike in
Venezuela and the prospect for an
imminent attack on Iraq, helped send the
price of oil soaring to
over $30 a barrel and
raise oil profit to nearly 7
per cent of the world total
(see Figure 2).
It’s All About Oil
Now let’s think about the
meaning of all of this. As
we have seen, the oil
companies have just
begun climbing from the abyss. To
continue their ascent, they need higher
oil prices, and the most effective way of
raising these prices is to have another
Middle East conflict. Similarly for the
armament companies. If they are to
remain viable in a uni-polar world, they
will need new wars, and quickly. Luck
has it, and these two groups now have
their most friendly president ever in the
White House. And this friendly president
is ready, in fact eager, to send his army to
fight Iraq, with or without UN approval.
For the Weapodollar-Petrodollar
Coalition, the new war is indeed about
oil, but not in the way most people think.
The interest of this coalition lies not in
stabilizing the region and making oil
plentiful and cheap, but on the contrary,
in maintaining instability, in making oil
look scarce and in raising its price
higher.
Interestingly, large firms outside the
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition –
that is, companies with no direct
connection to armament and oil – haven’t
voiced any real opposition to the war.
This silence is rather strange, to say the
least. Don’t the Microsofts, General
Motors and Vivendis of the world stand
to lose from higher energy cost and the
global stagnation which is almost sure to
follow? Furthermore, if oil prices and oil
profits were to rise, wouldn’t these
companies lose their primacy relative to
the Exxons and Lockheed Martins?
Perhaps, but this relative reordering may
be a cheap price to pay for the benefits to
be had.
As it turns out, the biggest threat facing
large firms at the moment is deflation.
The most ambivalent of the lot are
probably the OPEC governments. The
explicit shift toward interventionism on
part of the United States and its Western
allies must be worrying for them. Theirs
is the only international cartel which
managed to obtain some degree of
autonomy from Western influence, and
this autonomy is now in great danger. On
the other hand, part of the cartel’s
weakness stems precisely from its
inability to keep prices high, something
which a new conflict managed by direct
US intervention may help rectify.
The only ones for whom there seems to be
no ambiguity are the rest of us. The new
wars, fought in the name of security and
prosperity, are likely to bring neither.
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